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Abstract 
Why do institutions fail? With a focus on non-state market-driven governance, this paper explores the 
failures of the Flower Label Program and the Marine Aquarium Council. To date, research on private 
governance has tended to focus on the most robust and ‘successful’ cases of non-state institution-
building. While it makes sense to study the most developed systems, we posit that much can be 
learned by examining failed institutions and an analysis of these ‘non-cases’ is long overdue. In 
developing our argument about institutional failure, we draw on previous efforts examining the 
legitimation dynamics surrounding private forestry governance. The central argument of our 
framework is that processes of delegitimation can lead to institutional failure if they deprive private 
governance systems of key resources and competencies that they require to attain their stated goals. 
We show that poorly executed legitimation strategies in combination with inhospitable institutional 
environments are important factors causing delegitimation and ultimately institutional failure. 
Keywords 
Private governance, transnational regulation, legitimacy, legitimation, institutional failure. 
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Introduction  
Not only do sustainability issues transcend geographic borders, but the production and consumption 
decisions driving these issues are also often transnational in nature. Through the collaboration and 
contestation between business and civil society actors, private governance institutions are being 
developed to govern these transnational spaces.  
The bulk of studies on transnational private governance have focused on the forestry sector. In fact, 
as recently as 2008, some scholars were noting that there have been more studies on forestry and 
forestry codes than on all other industries combined (Vogel, 2008: 275). Of course, the focus on 
forestry was easily justified as it remains the sector with the most developed private governance 
institutions.  
While it makes sense to study these well-advanced arrangements, we posit that much can be 
learned by studying failed systems and an analysis of these ‘non-cases’ is long overdue. Many have 
failed in the past and it is important to understand the causal mechanisms leading to failure and to 
draw lessons that can be applied to current and future initiatives. One example of private governance 
failure is the PAN Parks Foundation; an initiative started by the Worldwide Fund for Nature (WWF) 
and the Dutch travel company Molecaten to certify nature parks in Europe (Rossberg, 2014). 
Likewise, in Sweden, retailers, trade unions, and NGOs came very close to reaching an agreement on 
voluntary labor standards for the apparel industry – called Dress Code – before it collapsed when trade 
unions dropped out (Fransen, 2012). Other failed cases include the systems examined in this study, 
namely, the Flower Label Program (FLP) and the Marine Aquarium Council (MAC).  
In developing our argument about institutional failure, we draw from research on legitimacy and 
legitimation (Bernstein, 2011; Bernstein & Cashore, 2007; Bexell, 2014; Cashore, 2002; Fransen, 
2012; Glasbergen, 2013; Schouten & Glasbergen, 2011). In particular, our approach is informed by 
previous efforts examining the legitimation dynamics surrounding non-state market-driven governance 
(NSMD) in the forestry sector (Bernstein & Cashore, 2007; Cashore, 2002; Cashore, Auld, & 
Newsom, 2003, 2004; Cashore, Egan, Auld, & Newsom, 2007). To complement those studies focused 
on how relatively successful institutions gained legitimacy, we seek to explore processes of 
delegitimation – a concept that, to date, remains under-researched. The central argument underpinning 
our framework is that processes of delegitimation can lead to institutional failure if they deprive 
NSMD systems of key resources and competencies that they require to attain their stated goals. We 
examine this explanation for private governance failure through an in-depth analysis and comparison 
of two understudied cases – the FLP and the MAC. Both of these systems were operational for a time, 
but eventually failed in terms of achieving their goals as outlined in their founding principles and, 
ultimately, did not survive as organizations. We show that poorly executed legitimation strategies in 
combination with inhospitable institutional environments were important factors causing 
delegitimation and ultimately institutional failure in these cases.  
We proceed by establishing a conceptual framework through which to explore private governance 
failure before examining the legitimation strategies and institutional environments of the FLP and 
MAC. We attempt to link theory to evidence throughout and conclude with some implications for how 
we understand the link between delegitimation and institutional failure, offering suggestions for future 
research based on our findings. 
Theorizing (De)legitimation and Private Governance Failure 
The legitimacy of private governance institutions has been studied from different angles. One 
important line of research is normative in its orientation (Bäckstrand, 2006; Dingwerth, 2007; 
Schaller, 2007). The common thread running through these works is that they theorize or evaluate the 
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legitimacy of private governance institutions using a normative ideal of democratic governance. 
Drawing on political theory (Dryzek, 2000), several authors rely on the notion of deliberative 
democracy as a model for conceptualizing legitimate private governance (Bäckstrand, 2006; 
Dingwerth, 2007). Also, Fritz Sharpf’s (1999) distinction between input and output legitimacy has 
been used as an evaluative framework (Schaller, 2007). While it is important to establish what 
(democratic) legitimacy could mean in the context of private governance and whether or not real-
world institutions live up to these criteria, these works say little about how NSMD systems can gain 
(or lose) legitimacy in the eyes of their core audiences.   
This, on the other hand, is the main focus of legitimation research that has its roots in sociology and 
organizational theory (Suchman, 1995). From this perspective, legitimacy is seen as a relational 
concept. It is granted or denied by an institution’s audiences in a dynamic process of legitimation 
(Bernstein, 2011; Bernstein & Cashore, 2007; Bexell, 2014; Fransen, 2012; Glasbergen, 2013; 
Schouten & Glasbergen, 2011). In the words of Steven Bernstein (2011: 19): ‘legitimacy results  from 
the interaction of the community of actors affected by the regulatory institution (…) that prevail[s] in 
the relevant issue area’. While normative criteria may play a role in these processes, Bernstein notes 
that legitimation is context specific. This means that these interactions can create varying legitimacy 
requirements across different issue areas.  
In our attempt to understand processes of delegitimation and institutional failure, we draw on this 
second perspective. To further nuance our investigation, we distinguish between two types of 
legitimacy – pragmatic and moral.1 Pragmatic legitimacy, according to Suchman (1995), is granted by 
an audience based on self-interested calculations of how it impacts their material well-being. In this 
way, the concept finds some common ground with March and Olsen’s (1998) idea of legitimacy based 
on the ‘logic of consequence’. Moral legitimacy, on the other hand, is granted based on an audience’s 
normative idea as to whether supporting the organization is ‘the right thing to do’ (Suchman, 1995: 
579). This dimension of Suchman’s typology is broadly aligned with March and Olsen’s (1998) ‘logic 
of appropriateness’, which is not based solely of rational self-interest (see also Cashore et al., 2003: 
228).  
This distinction is an important one as it not only sheds light on the process through which core 
audiences might grant legitimacy to an NSMD system, but also highlights the implications of these 
types of legitimacy on organizational activities (Cashore, 2002; Suchman, 1995). In the cases we 
explore below, we find that pragmatic concerns (e.g. cost considerations) were of key importance for 
economic actors, whereas NGOs were more likely to grant their support if NSMD governance 
corresponded to their moral values and convictions. Interestingly, in many situations, there seems to 
be a trade-off between the two and NSMD systems must navigate the precarious waters between 
pragmatic and moral legitimacy, as straying too far in one direction risks losing the audience in the 
other. 
In developing our argument about institutional failure, we draw on previous efforts examining the 
legitimation dynamics surrounding private governance in the forestry sector (Bernstein & Cashore, 
2007; Cashore, 2002; Cashore et al., 2003). The logic we deploy is straightforward. NSMD systems 
need to be seen as legitimate in the eyes of their core audiences in order to be successful. In the cases 
at hand, these are the targets of regulation (supply-side and demand-side economic actors) as well as 
the social and environmental NGOs and state actors with major stake in the marine ornamentals and 
cut flowers industries. We posit that the loss of pragmatic and/or moral support (delegitimation) from 
one or more of these core audiences can cause institutional failure, which we define as the inability of 
                                                     
1
 Here we are following the work of Cashore, Auld, and Newsom (2003) in both using Suchman’s typology and in altering 
it slightly. Suchman includes a third type of legitimacy – cognitive legitimacy – which is a legitimacy stemming from 
‘taken for grantedness’ or, in other words, ‘for things to be otherwise is literally unthinkable’ (Suchman, 1995: 583). 
Again following the lead of Cashore, Auld and Newsom (2003: 228), we find no instances of this type of legitimacy in 
our cases and, therefore, leave this dimension aside for the purposes of our study. 
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NSMD systems to attain their stated goals (Underdal & Young, 2004). More precisely, we expect 
institutional failure to happen if processes of delegitimation deprive NSMD systems of key resources 
and competencies, which they require to be successful in the way defined above.  
The link between delegitimation and institutional failure is very clear when we consider the first 
category of actors – the targets of regulation. Unlike public regulation, private governance is voluntary 
and a necessary condition for its success is the support and participation of key business groups. If 
these groups decide to withhold or withdraw their support from an NSMD system, it will fail in its 
central objective to regulate their behavior. But also NGOs and state actors may control important 
resources and competencies which NSMD systems need in order to be successful. NGOs, for example, 
possess moral authority. Their support brings credibility and independence, which private governance 
systems require to generate trust among consumers and other primary and secondary audiences. 
Furthermore, state actors and their agents may possess technical expertise and other competencies and 
resources critical for the development and smooth running of an NSMD system. Finally, all of the 
actor groups discussed above control material resources without which private governance systems, as 
organizations that have to rent offices and pay employees, cannot function effectively.  
Building on and extending the work that has been done on private forestry governance, we offer a 
two-part explanation of institutional failure – one is actor-centered, focused on the legitimation 
strategies and interactions of NSMD system initiators with their core audiences; the second is 
structural, based on the political-economic environment in which these interactions take place. The 
underlying assumption is that institutional failure can result from poorly executed legitimation 
strategies, inhospitable environments, or a combination of the two. The main contribution of our 
framework is to create a theoretical link between processes of delegitimation and institutional failure 
and to unravel the causal mechanisms at work. Our secondary contribution is empirical. While existing 
research on legitimation in private governance is skewed towards relatively successful institutions 
(Bernstein & Cashore, 2007; Cashore, 2002; Cashore et al., 2003; Glasbergen, 2013; Schouten & 
Glasbergen, 2011), we extend the analysis to the truly failed NSMD systems in the marine 
ornamentals and cut flower industries. By doing so, this article increases the universe of cases and 
range of outcomes studied. This creates a comparative perspective and will allow for a better 
understanding of (de)legitimation in private governance in future research. 
The first explanation we consider refers to the legitimation strategies deployed by the initiators and 
close supporters of NSMD governance. We base our analysis on the work of Suchman (1995), which 
has been adapted by Cashore (2002) and Cashore, Auld and Newsom (2003) to explain how NSMD 
systems – in particular, forestry certifications – have managed to gain rule-making authority. 
According to this model, legitimation strategies can be categorized as manipulating, conforming, or 
informing. Each type of ‘achievement strategy’ emphasizes the active pursuit of legitimation by 
NSMD initiators, whether it be conforming to audience needs, manipulating audience incentives, or 
informing audiences of the relevant issues (see Table 1). Using this model, Cashore and his 
collaborators posit that the success of NSMD systems depends, at least in part, on the effectiveness of 
these strategies in gaining the necessary legitimacy to underpin rule making authority. We extend this 
argument to explain NSMD failure – NSMD systems fail when these strategies are not deployed 
effectively.  
Table 1: Legitimation Strategies 
Conforming Manipulating Informing 
Strategies to conform to core 
audiences’ pragmatic and/or 
moral demands.  
Strategies to manipulate core 
audiences’ pragmatic and/or 
moral preferences (very difficult 
to manipulate moral 
preferences).  
Strategies to inform core 
audiences about the pragmatic 
and/or moral value of 
supporting NSMD governance. 
Table adapted from Suchman 1995; Cashore 2002. 
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Structural variables form our second set of explanatory factors. They refer to the characteristics of the 
political-economic environment in which NSMD system are being institutionalized. The general idea 
is that NSMD systems can fail due to an inhospitable environment that inhibits their initiators and 
close supporters from executing their legitimation strategies effectively. Adapted from Cashore et al. 
(2003), our framework includes factors related to the specific industry and firm structure, the political 
salience of the issue itself, and the existence and character of any competing NSMD systems. Some of 
the key arguments referring to the political-economic environment are summarized in Table 2.  
Table 2: Important structural variables 
Degree of fragmentation Industry/firm 
characteristics 
Political salience Competitive pressures 
The benefit of certification 
decreases with firm size. 
In relative terms, smaller 
firms face higher search 
and information costs and 
implementation costs than 
larger firms. This makes it 
more difficult for NSMD 
systems in highly 
fragmented industries to 
conform to firms’ 
pragmatic demands. 
NSMD systems and their 
supporters often use 
manipulation strategies 
(e.g. naming and 
shaming campaigns) to 
gain pragmatic support 
from economic actors. 
These strategies are 
more likely to be 
effective in industries 
that are consumer facing 
and in which brands play 
a major role.  
Industries or issue areas 
that have a low priority 
on the public agenda are 
inhospitable 
environments. In these 
environments, it is more 
difficult to convince core 
audiences of the 
value/importance of 
NSMD governance. 
Therefore, informing 
strategies are less likely 
to be effective. 
Industries or issue areas 
in which competition 
from other NSMD 
systems is strong are 
inhospitable 
environments. If 
competitor programs 
offer more preferable 
conditions to core 
audiences then 
conforming strategies are 
more difficult to deploy. 
Summing up the above discussion, the central argument of our framework is that processes of 
delegitimation can lead to institutional failure if they deprive NSMD systems of key resources and 
competencies that they require to attain their stated goals. We hypothesize that poorly executed 
legitimation strategies in combination with inhospitable institutional environments are important 
factors causing delegitimation, which we understand as a loss of pragmatic and/or moral support from 
a private governance system’s core audiences.  
In the following, we explore and illustrate this argument through two in-depth case studies. The 
rationale behind our case selection is to apply the framework to two key areas of private governance – 
private labor governance and private environmental governance. In this way, we hope to explore 
causal relationships that are not context-specific and that help us gain more general insights into 
processes of delegitimation and private governance failure. The first case study is the institutional 
failure of the FLP, a multi-stakeholder initiative developed to improve the working conditions of farm 
workers in the international cut flower industry. The second case study looks at the collapse of the 
MAC, a multi-stakeholder initiative created to mitigate the environmental impact of the international 
trade in ornamental fish and coral. While King, Keohane, Verba (1994: 129-149) warn against 
selecting cases on the dependent variable, in particular cases with similar outcomes, we justify this 
choice with the existing bias toward successful institutions in the literature. In this regard, our cases 
complement previous studies on legitimation dynamics in private governance, creating a comparative 
perspective to be exploited in future research.  
The analytical approach we have taken is exploratory in character and combines deductive with 
inductive reasoning. This means that our empirical work was guided by the two sets of explanatory 
factors discussed above. However, our goal was not simply to verify or falsify these mechanisms, but 
to inductively learn from our cases in order to develop and improve our understanding of 
delegitimation dynamics and private governance failure. For the empirical analysis, we draw on 14 
semi-structured interviews. The interviews targeted economic actors, NGOs, and private governance 
managers in the ornamental fish and cut flower industries. In 2014, 8 people were interviewed about 
the FLP and 6 people were interviewed about the MAC. The information from the interviews was 
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triangulated with primary documents (meeting minutes, background documents, and websites) and 
media reports.   
Case Study 1: Flower Label Program  
The international trade in cut flowers is booming. In 2011, the European Union (EU), the world’s 
largest market for flower products, imported 314,975 tons of cut flowers and cut foliage, worth 1.2 
billion Euros. The majority of the EU’s flower imports are produced in developing countries in Africa 
and South America. Currently, the top five foreign producer countries for the European market are in 
order of market share: Kenya (30%), Ecuador (11.8%), Ethiopia (10.7%), Colombia (9.5%), and Israel 
(8.6%) (European Commission, 2012). Compared to other cash crops such as coffee, tea, or cotton, cut 
flowers are a relatively new agricultural export commodity. Only in the past thirty years has the 
production and export of cut flowers become an important source of income for countries in the global 
south. For example, in Kenya flower production now accounts for 1.6% of GDP and is one of the top 
foreign exchange earners for the country (Kenya Flower Council, 2015).  
While the production and export of cut flowers has become an important pillar of the agriculture 
dominated economies of Kenya, Ecuador, Columbia and other developing countries, the industry has 
long had a reputation of poor working conditions. Like other agriculture sectors, cut flower production 
is a highly labor intensive industry. It is estimated that in Kenya alone 500,000 people (including 
90,000 flower farm workers) depend on the floriculture sector for their livelihoods (Kenya Flower 
Council, 2015). However, the working conditions of flower workers in Africa and South America 
often violate international labor standards, as reports from NGOs, the media, and trade unions have 
documented in detail (e.g. Pesticides Action Network, 2008; The Guardian, 2001). Common abuses of 
workers’ rights in the industry include low wages, excessive overtime work, and poor health and 
safety conditions (e.g. exposure to toxic pesticides).  
The FLP was created to improve the labor conditions of cut flower workers. The program 
developed principles and criteria for better working conditions and operated a certification system to 
implement its code of conduct in the industry’s global supply chain. After the FLP was launched in 
1999, the program scaled-up quickly and at its height there were fifty-four certified farms in six 
countries, employing more than 13,000 cut flower workers (FLP, 2011). However, in 2011, the FLP 
was dismantled after more than 10 years of activity. What has caused this institutional failure? The 
following section explores this question by applying the framework developed above to the case of the 
FLP. In a first step, the legitimation strategies of the initiators of the FLP and its close supporters are 
examined. This is followed by an analysis of the political-economic environment in which these 
strategies were deployed.   
Legitimation Strategies 
The empirical analysis revealed how labor rights NGOs successfully used manipulation strategies to 
create the ground for NSMD governance in the cut flower industry. These manipulation strategies 
manifested itself in form of direct targeting of demand-side industry actors in Europe. Through this 
strategy, FLP initiators attempted to manipulate market incentives to achieve demand for certification 
and, ultimately, to generate pragmatic support for NSMD governance among key industry actors. 
Additionally, this type of action helped to create an environment conducive to future legitimation 
strategies by establishing and reinforcing the political salience of the issue for the various stakeholder 
groups. 
When reports about poor working conditions in the floriculture industry in Ecuador and Colombia 
started circulating within the international human rights community in the early 1990s, NGOs and 
trade unions across Europe launched naming and shaming campaigns. Led by the human rights 
organization FIAN (Food First Information and Action Network), the evangelical aid organization 
Philip Schleifer and Michael Bloomfield 
6 
Bread for the World, and the children’s interest group Terre des Hommes, a strong campaigning 
network formed in Germany. Together with other NGOs, they launched the so-called 
“Blumenkampagne” (flower campaign) in 1990/1991. The campaign put pressure on traders and their 
lead industry association, the BGI (Union of German Flower Wholesalers and Importers), to improve 
the working conditions in the flower farms supplying the German market. To put pressure on the 
industry, campaigners took advantage of the high turnover ‘flower profit days’, like Valentine’s Day 
and Mother’s Day, for their awareness raising activities. Similar activities were organized by NGOs in 
other European countries such as the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.  
This manipulation strategy had the intended effect of generating pragmatic support for NSMD 
governance from key players in the cut flower industry. In the mid-1990s, a pan-European coalition of 
NGOs, trade unions, and industry representatives was formed with the goal of developing a set of 
criteria for better working conditions in the cut flower industry. Released in 1998, the so-called 
International Code of Conduct for the Production of Cut Flowers (ICC) comprised ten principles ‘to 
guarantee that flowers have been produced under socially and environmentally sustainable conditions’ 
(ICC, 1998). Under strong pressure from local NGOs, the German flower industry even went a step 
further. In 1995, the BGI and the German Florist Association (FDF) approached the German Technical 
Cooperation Agency (GTZ) and the German Ministry of Development (BMZ) for financial and 
technical assistance and launched a forerunner program of the FLP (GTZ, 2004). Some of the NGOs 
of flower campaign were involved in conducting pilot projects in Ecuador and Columbia and in 1999 a 
decision was made to launch the FLP as a multi-stakeholder process.  
Based on the ICC, the coalition of NGOs, wholesalers, and trade unions developed a standard, 
designed a certification system, and established the FLP as a formal organization in May 2003, with a 
permanent secretariat in Cologne. The FLP membership was organized in four stakeholder chambers 
(NGOs, trade unions, traders, and producers), which met once a year in the form of a General 
Assembly. According to the statutes of the FLP, the General Annual Meeting was the highest 
decision-making body. But effectively decision-making was concentrated in the FLP Board, which, 
reflecting the multi-stakeholder structure of the General Meeting, also controlled the FLP Secretariat. 
A so-called Certification Committee was in charge of the certification process (e.g. accreditation of 
auditors, assessment of audit reports). On the ground, the work of the FLP was supported by a local 
coordinator for South America and one for East Africa, the program’s two target regions (FLP, 2008). 
During the first year of the program’s existence, the FLP’s membership base expanded quickly. By 
December 2004, the number of producer members had reached fifty-one. Whereas most certified 
farms were located in Ecuador, also producers from Kenya, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, and South Africa 
joined the FLP – a testament to the perceived pragmatic legitimacy of the nascent program (FLP, 
2011).  
Supporters of the FLP mobilized informing strategies to further enhance the pragmatic and moral 
legitimacy of the program. A study conducted by the GTZ argued that it had drastically improved the 
labor and living conditions of more than 12,000 flower workers on FLP-certified farms when 
compared to the situation at the beginning of the 1990s. However, some of the problems that later 
contributed to the failure of the FLP, such as the reluctance of the BGI and FDF to promote the label 
and producer concerns about the costs and benefits of FLP certification, were already visible at this 
stage. In light of these issues, the GTZ report concluded on a cautionary note, pointing out that ‘the 
FLP can only function with the cooperation of the different partners: commerce, producers, NGOs and 
unions. It is therefore important that all the interest groups continually show an active interest in the 
FLP’ (GTZ, 2004).  
In the first few years of the program’s existence, the FLP’s civil society members put much effort 
and resources in promoting the label among German consumers. They organized events and published 
reports and promoted the program in the media (FIAN, 2006). But a major problem preventing the 
label’s success on the German market was the lack of support from florists. They saw little value in 
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the FLP. To the contrary, they feared that FLP certification could harm their business by creating 
unwanted attention around labor standard issues in the industry.  
There was a lot of skepticism and resistance at the retail end and the BGI and FDF did little to 
address these concerns. In the interviews, the Coordinator of the FLP secretariat and the NGO and 
trade union representatives accused the two industry associations of free-riding. They complained that 
the BGI and FDF had not shown enough commitment and had failed to promote the label in the 
industry.
2
 As a consequence of these demand-side problems, the label reached only a small market 
share of approximately 3 to 4 percent in Germany (Merkur Online, 2011). In sum, the founding 
members of the FLP were unable to deploy an effective information strategy and, in particular, to 
convince demand-side economic actors of the pragmatic value of NSMD governance in the sector.  
Another major problem for the FLP was to conform to and reconcile the (conflicting) pragmatic 
and moral demands of its core audiences. This proved to be increasingly difficult and eventually led to 
the failure of the program in 2011. A conflict, which existed from the very beginning, revolved around 
the distribution of costs between supply-side and demand-side economic actors. On the one hand, 
producers in the FLP demanded a price premium for certified flowers and the introduction of a quota 
system, obliging traders to buy fixed quantities of certified flowers. Traders, on the other hand, argued 
that the FLP code of conduct was a minimum standard, and that you ‘should not pay someone for not 
violating basic human rights’.3 The refusal of demand-side companies to agree to a price premium and 
quota system led to great frustration among producer groups in the FLP. They felt that they had to bear 
most of the costs arising from certification, without receiving any tangible benefits in return. Under 
the FLP system, they had to pay a membership fee of US $1000. Additionally, flower farms had to pay 
US $100 per hectare of land, to a maximum of US $2500 per farm (GTZ, 2004). But different from 
many organic farming and fair trade initiatives, they did not receive a price premium for their certified 
products. In their view, this eroded the pragmatic legitimacy of the FLP. This frustration increased 
when wholesalers and florists failed to promote the label in Germany. Problematic for the FLP, this 
led to bad payment behavior of its producer constituency, threatening the organization’s resource 
base.
4
  
Another major conflict evolved around trade union rights on FLP certified farms. This conflict 
developed into a major institutional crisis, leading NGOs and trade unions to question the moral 
legitimacy of the program and, along with the continuing erosion of its pragmatic legitimacy, this 
eventually led to its failure. For some time, the civil society-controlled Certification Committee had 
complained about the state of trade union rights on many of the FLP certified farms. Up until then, the 
FLP had accepted the existence of so-called workers councils as an equivalent to trade union 
representation. However, the Certification Committee felt that this had only been a transitional 
measure, and that it was now time for FLP certified producers to fully implement this component of 
the standard.
5
 Already frustrated about the conflict over price premiums and quotas, producers in the 
FLP were outraged about the NGOs tough stance on trade union rights. In particular in Ecuador, where 
many of the FLP certified farms were located, industry-union relationships were very contentious and 
accepting trade union representation on their farms constituted a ‘no go’ for many owners. At the 
Annual Meeting of Members in 2011, the conflict over trade union rights escalated, and a large group 
of producers declared their withdrawal from the organization or were de-certified for their failure to 
bring their operations into compliance.  
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3
 Interview with the Coordinator of the FLP Secretariat, via phone, June 2014. 
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By December 2011, only 19 of 54 FLP-certified farms were left (FLP, 2011). For the FLP, this 
meant financial ruin. In response, NGOs and trade unions also pulled out of the FLP, arguing that they 
had lost confidence in the program and that without proper controls the label would be meaningless 
and could be misused to make unsubstantiated claims.
6
 One NGO representative explained:  
‘When we started the FLP in the late 1990s certification was fairly new and we believed that we 
could make a difference with this. But we became increasingly disillusioned and frustrated about 
producers and traders not living up to their commitments.’
7
 
Following the collapse of the FLP at the end of 2011, the remaining traders and florists made an 
attempt to revive and consolidate the program (FLP, 2012). However, delegitimized through the 
withdrawal of its producer and civil society constituencies and lacking a solid financial basis, these 
efforts failed as well.  
The Political-Economic Environment 
Through the in-depth analysis political-environmental factors were identified to have contributed to 
the institutional failure of the FLP. In particular, a highly fragmented industry and strong competitive 
pressures from other certification schemes made it very difficult for the FLP and its initiators to deploy 
their legitimation strategies effectively.  
The cut flower industry consists of different market segments. On a very general level, a distinction 
can be made between the supply chain for the fast moving retail sector and the supply chain for 
florists. The level of corporate concentration is relatively high in the retail segment. Large flower 
farms with a farm size of 2,000 hectares and more, many of which located in Kenya, produce the cut 
flowers for the big retail companies like Aldi, REWE, and EDEKA. (Kenya Flower Council, 2015). 
On the other hand, the degree of fragmentation is significantly higher in the florist supply chain, both 
on the supply and demand side. One of the major producing countries supplying the German florist 
market is Ecuador. Most businesses in Ecuador are family-owned and the average farm size is 2 
hectares. The demand-side is also highly fragmented. In Germany, there are more than 14,000 
individual florists who buy their flowers from more than 2,000 local wholesalers (Volksbanken 
Raiffeisenbanken, 2013: 2). Another difference between the two market segments is that supermarkets 
specialize in mono-bouquets, whereas florists mostly sell individual bouquets. This means that the 
variety of flowers handled by florists is significantly higher when compared to the retailers.
8
  
With the industry associations of the German wholesalers and florists as founding members, the 
FLP’s main focus was on the florist segment. This was a challenging environment for a certification 
system like the FLP. The high level of fragmentation at the supply-side made the certification process 
time consuming and resource intensive. At the same time, flower farmers faced high implementation 
costs and without offering them tangible benefits it was difficult to maintain their support. Also, the 
complexities of the demand side posed a problem to the FLP. As mentioned above, there are thousands 
of individual florists in Germany and the variety of products handled in their shops is large. In this 
environment, the FLP had problems developing an effective labeling strategy and, fearing to tarnish 
their non-certified products, many florists resisted the idea of an on-product label altogether.
9
 In sum, 
the high level of fragmentation in this market segment made it very difficult for the FLP to win the 
pragmatic support of both supply and demand side economic actors.  
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 FIAN published a detailed press release, describing the reasons for its withdrawal from the FLP (in German) (FIAN, 
2012). 
7
 Interview with an NGO representative, via phone, June 2014. The quote was translated by the author. 
8
 Interview with a German flower wholesaler, via phone, June 2014. 
9
 Interview with the Coordinator of the FLP Secretariat, via phone, June 2014. 
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Another factor that has contributed to the institutional failure of the FLP was competition from 
other certification systems. In the mid-2000s, several competitor schemes entered the European 
certification market and the FLP’s core market in Germany. One important scheme was the Fairtrade 
Labelling Organization (FLO), which began certifying roses in 2004. Unlike the FLP system, the FLO 
operates on the basis of a price premium. This means that FLO-certified flowers are sold at a higher 
price to the end consumer and this extra revenue goes to the benefit of the producer (FLO, 2015). With 
its price premium system and focus on selected products, the FLO was a very attractive model for the 
large Kenyan flower farms supplying the European retail sector. Also, the FLP had tried to expand its 
activities in this quickly growing market segment, but soon found itself outcompeted by the FLO.
10
  
The competitive pressures on the FLP increased further with the creation of Fair Flowers Fair 
Plants (FFFP) in 2005. More international in its outlook, the FFFP was initiated by Union Fleur, the 
international trade association of the flower industry. Unlike the FLP, the FFFP does not operate its 
own certification system, but uses benchmarking to recognize existing standards and labels. Backed by 
the powerful Dutch flower industry,
11
 the FFFP quickly developed into a major competitor for the FLP 
on the German market as well. For several years, the FLP tried to reach a ‘memorandum of 
understanding’ with the FFFP which would have established a close partnership between the two 
programs. In particular, the German wholesalers and florists within the FLP strongly pushed for such 
an agreement. However, the negotiations failed, mainly due to the opposition from the FLP’s NGO 
constituency. In particular, FIAN was highly critical of the FFFP system, which it perceived to be 
dominated by Dutch industry interests. Disappointed about the failure to reach an agreement, the BGI, 
one of the founding members of the FLP, left the organization in 2007 and joined the FFFP instead.
12
 
This last episode demonstrates how competitive pressures increased the tensions between NGOs and 
economic actors. For the FLP, it was not possible to find a common ground between the conflicting 
positions.  
Case Study 2: Marine Aquarium Council  
The trade in ornamental fish and coral for private hobbyists and public aquariums has grown from its 
modest beginnings in the 1950s to an industry trading an estimated US $200-300 million annually 
(Gopakumar, 2004; Larkin & Degner, 2001; Shuman, Hodgson, & Ambrose, 2004). More than 95 
percent of species supplying the marine aquarium industry are wild harvested and their collection and 
sale constitute a major livelihood strategy for many living in small fishing villages in Southeast Asia 
(Auld, Cashore, Balboa, Bozzi, & Renckens, 2010; Gopakumar, 2004; Wabnitz, Taylor, Green, & 
Razak, 2003). The industry is composed of collectors, exporters, importers, retailers, and consumers. 
While this is a global industry, the vast majority of fish are collected in the Philippines and Indonesia 
and the largest retail market is the United States (US). 
Irresponsible collection practices have been implicated in coral reef destruction. Negative impacts 
of the trade include stress and bleaching of coral due to the widespread use of cyanide to capture fish, 
the breaking apart of coral to access fish that are hiding, the overfishing of particular target species, 
the targeting of species not suitable to aquariums, and the extremely high post-harvest mortality of 
collected specimens, which in the 1980s was up to about 65% of organisms harvested (Gopakumar, 
2008: 74-75; Shuman et al., 2004: 341). 
The MAC was created to certify practices in the collection and trade of live fish from reef to retail. 
While certainly not the most significant threat facing coral reefs worldwide, the creators of the MAC 
saw the potential for not just ensuring a sustainable marine ornamentals trade, but the opportunity to 
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(European Commission, 2012). 
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use the industry and the certification to ‘create an anchor for broad coral reef protection’ (Bunting, 
2001: 5). The initiative ran from 1998 until 2010, when it collapsed. Why did this institution fail? 
Following the framework developed above, we begin with the legitimation strategies of its creators 
and supporters before turning to the political-economic environment in which these strategies were 
implemented. 
Legitimation Strategies 
The empirical investigation showed that the WWF, the principle founding organization behind the 
MAC, utilized manipulation strategies to lay the groundwork for NSMD governance in the marine 
ornamentals trade. These strategies focused on the demand-side of the supply chain, which mostly 
consists of wholesalers, retailers, hobbyists, and public aquariums. The idea was to establish a demand 
for certified marine organisms, thereby creating a market incentive for certified fish and, in so doing, 
creating a demand for the NSMD system itself. This demand would be based on the pragmatic 
legitimacy of the MAC system as it would offer suppliers an incentive to become certified, namely, 
accessing this new market. Additionally, we see evidence of a longer-term strategy by the MAC 
initiators. They wanted to use the marine ornamentals trade to create incentives for broader marine 
ecosystem conservation based on the economic returns from these new markets, while also informing 
the public and key stakeholders of the issues associated with coral reefs and the moral legitimacy of 
programs designed to protect them.  
While it was never going to be easy, those spearheading MAC had good reason to believe it could 
succeed. Unofficial and official surveys amongst importers, retailers and hobbyists showed both 
general support for a certification and a willingness to pay (Shuman et al., 2004: 343). Furthermore, 
there were no competing certification programs, poor practices (like the use of cyanide) were linked to 
poor quality fish, industry actors were concerned about the image of the industry, and there was a 
potential future price premium available for collectors. Taken together, there seemed to be a positive 
enabling environment, based on pragmatic appeal, for MAC certification to establish itself and 
improve the trade. 
The MAC initiators set to work, utilizing informing strategies to enhance both the pragmatic and 
moral legitimacy that seemed available for such an initiative. Forming cross-sectoral coalitions at 
regional conferences and workshops, the organizers defined the parameters of the guidelines and 
rolled out the standards and rationale behind them in industry publications and at industry gatherings.  
Discussions began in 1997 and, through funds from the US Agency for International Development, 
the David and Lucile Packard Foundation and the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, 
MAC was officially launched in 1998. Drawing participants from industry and civil society, they 
quickly formed an Interim Board, hired an Executive Director, and released the MAC eco-label in 
2001.  
At MAC headquarters in Honolulu, Hawaii, a number of multi-stakeholder workshops were held 
and collection and handling guidelines were drafted. These guidelines addressed three main aspects of 
the wild harvest of marine ornamentals: 1) Ecosystem and Fishery Management; 2) Collection, 
Fishing, and Holding; and 3) Handling, Husbandry, and Transport. With representatives of both 
conservation organizations and industry present, the MAC architects could negotiate between the 
pragmatic and moral demands underpinning the granting of legitimacy from both sectors – conforming 
to the realities of industry while informing delegates of the need and mechanisms with which they will 
be tackling the issue. 
However, these informing and conforming strategies suffered from a fatal flaw – a lack of 
information and input from supply-side stakeholders. Based on the interviews, there was a feeling 
amongst stakeholders that MAC was too US-centered – the standards themselves were developed in 
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Honolulu without enough input from stakeholders on the ground in the source countries.
 12 
Those who 
were charged with implementing the standards report that collectors felt there was too much 
paperwork and the requirements were too complex.
13
 So while the MAC creators appeared to find 
some success in finding a balance between pragmatic and moral legitimacy amongst civil society and 
demand-side economic actors, the practitioners working at the supply-side were largely absent from 
the process. 
Despite these design flaws, MAC began rolling out the pilot stages of the initiative in the South 
Pacific and expanded from there. At its height, MAC involved some 2600 stakeholders from over 60 
countries (Gopakumar, 2004, 2008) and gained recognition from the ISEAL alliance, a certifier of 
certifications (ISEAL, 2015). But even these numbers were dwarfed by the sheer magnitude of the 
task. For example, in the early 2000s, it only claimed 63 members of the estimated 7,000 collectors in 
the Philippines (Alencastro, 2004; Bunting, 2001). And these vast numbers of practitioners simply 
represent the collection node in this complex and diffuse commodity chain. As it was conceived, MAC 
needed to certify both products and practices, everybody from collection to handling to transport to 
retail. 
In order to achieve these goals, MAC and its supporters decided to pursue what could be regarded 
as a conforming strategy: to build capacity to fulfill MAC requirements at the source sites. Instead of 
changing the standards developed largely at the demand end of the supply chain (i.e. conforming the 
standards to meet the reality on the ground), the MAC initiators decided to help the supply-side 
stakeholders conform to this demand. Toward this end, MAC obtained funding from the Global 
Environment Facility, implemented by the International Finance Corporation (IFC). In partnership 
with the Reef Check Foundation and the Conservation and Community Investment Forum, MAC led a 
five-year (2005-2009) initiative called the Marine Aquarium Market Transformation Initiative 
(MAMTI). 
The idea behind MAMTI was to build capacity in the source countries to meet the requirements of 
the MAC standards, to establish a baseline and monitor the coral reefs for stocks and health, to 
establish no-take zones and facilitate reef restoration, and increase participation and awareness of 
stakeholders at both ends of the marine ornamentals supply chain (Bellamy & Winsby, 2008: 2). The 
targets of the project were ambitious, including: 1) transforming at least 17% of the worldwide marine 
aquarium industry (21% of the industry in the Philippines and Indonesia), which they claimed would 
provide the critical mass to make MAC successful and sustainable; 2) establishing marine 
management areas, which needed baselines to be established and managed, and; 3) increasing 
awareness of the benefits of harvesting marine ornamentals in a manner that conserves global 
biodiversity at both ends of the supply chain. 
MAC achieved some of its targets through the MAMTI project, including establishing some 
collection areas and training a number of collectors in sustainable techniques. However, an interview 
with a former MAC field manager revealed an additional problem with the MAC strategy. While 
MAC was successfully training and certifying individual suppliers, the industry is composed of 
already established trade chains. To ensure traceability requires an unbroken chain from reef to retail 
and those industry actors certified did not always match up with these established trade chains, 
meaning their certification did not always result in a certified product being available at the demand 
end of the supply chain.
14
 
On 30 April 2008, a Mid-Term Review of MAMTI, commissioned by the IFC, arrived in 
Washington. The report documents a few successes and a large number of failings. It recommended 
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that funding be cut as it seemed unlikely the project could meet its goals. The IFC cancelled the grant 
to MAC and terminated the project. While MAC continued in some capacity for a couple years 
beyond this, by 2010 the money had stopped coming in and the focus became stabilizing the financial 
situation for the purpose of closing up shop.
15
 
The Political-Economic Environment 
The empirical investigation revealed environmental factors that created an inhospitable environment 
for the MAC creators and their close supporters. Specifically, the highly fragmented nature of the 
industry and the lack of political salience of the issue undercut the legitimation efforts of the MAC 
initiators from the very beginning. 
Those working on the MAC initiative faced many challenges when attempting to establish a chain 
of custody from reef to retail in the ornamental fish trade, many of which stemmed from the nature of 
the industry itself. As mentioned, this is a very diffuse industry with thousands of individual collectors 
who would need to be certified. But this was not the only challenge. The supply chain becomes very 
long once we consider the goals of MAC, which was to certify not only the practices and products at 
the source, but also the transport and handling of the organisms all the way to the retail node. As such, 
in order for a product to be MAC-certified, every stage in the supply chain must be certified – and the 
products travelling through these various stages must be kept verifiably separate from those products 
falling outside the initiative.  
This verification proved to be extremely difficult and skepticism was rife amongst buyers, many of 
whom expressed concerns over mixing of certified and non-certified fish by exporters and importers 
(McCollum, 2007: 29). Despite the advancements in chemical testing to establish where the organisms 
originated and whether cyanide was used to capture them, the tests kill the fish, remain costly, and the 
accuracy has been questioned on scientific grounds (Auld et al., 2010: 18). Furthermore, the science of 
coral reefs is still not well understood. Baselines needed to be established and high levels of 
skepticism from buyers about the effective assessment of ecosystem impacts were also reported 
(Alencastro, 2004). Part of this stems from the limited ability to monitor the stocks and environment. 
Another challenge is determining the exact source of reef or stock degradation. There are many 
potential drivers of reef damage – over-fishing for food, destructive fishing practices, pollution and 
climate change, to name but a few. Thus, it becomes difficult to attribute successes and failures to 
specific practices and, importantly, brings the ability to push reef conservation through the 
certification of the relatively benign ornamental fish industry into question. 
Whether the inherent challenges of certifying this industry could be overcome through deft 
management remains an open question, but there is no doubt that the industry and market environment 
was a challenging one. Based on the mid-term review of the IFC, past studies and interviews with key 
stakeholders, the combination of market fragmentation and an inability or unwillingness to adapt 
contributed to MAC’s demise. 
While the innovators behind MAC used the experiences of the more advanced Forest Stewardship 
Council (FSC) and Marine Stewardship Council models, clearly the ornamental fish industry required 
a customized approach. While the FSC could potentially provide a good a template for learning, there 
are significant differences between the industries, including a lack of big companies in the 
ornamentals trade, which means the industry as a whole was much more fragmented at every node. 
The retail companies at the demand-side of the chain were smaller and therefore had less individual 
leverage, to say nothing of the thousands of individual collectors that dominate the supply-side of the 
chain, approximately 80 percent of whom are roving collectors (more on this below), which meant 
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MAC was unable to certify them based on its original model.
16
 This begs the question of whether the 
conforming strategy of capacity building was really the best choice for MAC.  
While the speed at which the certification progressed is certainly impressive, it may have been too 
fast. In addition to the need for more industry data, there was significant capacity building that needed 
to take place in the source countries themselves. The baselines were not in place and there were too 
few performance indicators to convince buyers, suppliers, and funders alike. This compromised the 
reliability of MAC standards and the overall initiative in the eyes of many stakeholders (Bellamy & 
Winsby, 2008; McCollum, 2007: 29). 
While the project could have potentially made inroads in a more contained and regulated 
jurisdiction, such as Hawaii or Fiji, MAC management decided to roll it out in the much more 
complex environments of the Philippines and Indonesia. There are good reasons to concentrate on 
these source countries: combined they constitute 80 percent of the supply of fish. However, it proved 
to be too soon to get the certification the critical mass it needed to establish itself and its products.
17
 
Different strategies are needed in different countries, and Indonesia and the Philippines were perhaps 
the most difficult to tackle. For example, while reefs in the US and Australia are highly regulated by 
government agencies and Fijian reefs generally fall under a customary marine tenure system putting 
local families or villages in control of protection (Wood, 2001), Indonesia’s government agencies lack 
the capacity to enforce existing regulations and the country’s free access laws make local protection 
schemes difficult (CCIF, 2001; Shuman et al., 2004). 
Perhaps the greatest hurdle was that, as mentioned previously, 80 percent of these collectors were 
‘roving’ collectors and the scheme, as it was planned, could only certify ‘resident’ collectors. As 
management estimated MAC would need about 21 percent of the collectors in these countries (17 
percent of collectors worldwide) to buy in to achieve the critical mass needed to sustain the 
organization, this was never achievable as the project was planned (Bellamy & Winsby, 2008). Some 
key stakeholders feel that this was the most critical error of MAC management; they bit off more than 
they could chew and if they had begun with a more contained and controlled environment in which to 
establish some successes, they could have then taken these successes to other stakeholders and slowly 
expanded from there.
18 
In other words, it would appear that under these very challenging conditions 
the capacity building strategy of MAC was ill conceived. Instead, perhaps either a conforming strategy 
to adapt the guidelines to match the realities on the ground in the Philippines and Indonesia, or perhaps 
switching venues and launching the program in the US or South Pacific where some baselines and 
enforcement capacity were already established may have proven more effective.
19
 Perhaps such a 
change could have garnered enough pragmatic legitimacy to build upon and, ultimately, may have 
saved the MAC. 
Despite having some success in gaining the tacit support of stakeholders at the demand end of the 
supply chain, there was never a convincing argument underpinning the pragmatic legitimacy of the 
system. One important difference between this case and the FLP – as well as between this case and 
‘successful’ cases of NSMD systems in different industries – is that the political salience of the issue 
was comparatively low. Even though some of its supporters cited a ‘Nemo effect’, emanating from the 
interest stoked by the Disney movie ‘Finding Nemo’, it was never clear that this was ever enough to 
compel market actors to give preference to, yet alone pay a premium for, certified marine organisms.
20
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Unlike the FLP case, there was never a sustained campaign targeting the industry and so public 
pressure was negligible. 
Such pressure could have proven beneficial for the MAC given the lack of certainty regarding 
market incentives. Connecting back to the industry environment, there seems to have been a lack of 
knowledge about the industry from the beginning – at least in terms of the key indicators necessary to 
ensure the successful implementation of a sustainable certification. According to a number of 
observers, and reported on by the key funding agency backing the initiative, there was never sufficient 
‘hard data’ that buyers were willing to pay the premium that a sustainable MAC demanded (Bellamy 
& Winsby, 2008). Without this information, it becomes very difficult to convince stakeholders to grant 
the system the pragmatic legitimacy it needs to succeed. Additionally, the costs were clearly too high 
for stakeholders in the source countries to cover and so MAC needed industry to absorb these 
additional fees. Furthermore, the numbers needed to create the market incentives necessary to both 
change industry practices and sustain a self-financing NSMD system were uncertain and probably 
ambitious (Bellamy & Winsby, 2008).  
Without any real political pressure on either the demand-side or supply-side stakeholders, the MAC 
could not garner the pragmatic legitimacy from these audiences that it needed to survive. Faced with a 
complex industry and a lack of political interest, efforts to reform the organization appear to have 
failed and the MAC website went silent in January 2010.  
Conclusion 
In attempting to explain private governance failure, we drew upon past work examining how relatively 
successful NSMD systems have gained rule-making authority in the forestry sector. Applying these 
insights to the failed cases of the marine ornamentals and cut flower industries, we hypothesized that 
processes of delegitimation (a lack of pragmatic and/or moral support from core audiences) can lead to 
institutional failure if they deprive NSMD systems of key resources and competencies that they 
require to attain their stated goals.  
Our framework offered a two-part explanation of how NSMD programs might fail at gaining and 
maintaining legitimacy. The first involved whether the legitimation strategies by the initiators and 
supporters of the scheme were effectively deployed toward this end. The second was whether the 
external environment was conducive to the strategies chosen. Our findings lend initial support to our 
framework. 
In the case studies above, each system deployed legitimation strategies aimed at gaining and 
maintaining both pragmatic and moral legitimacy. The initiators of both NSMD systems began with 
manipulation strategies aimed at creating incentives to join their respective schemes. However, in the 
cut flower industry, the strategies were much more public and political, which helped create an 
enabling environment for the future FLP by reinforcing the political salience of the issues facing the 
industry. This political salience, as hypothesized by Cashore, Auld and Newsom (2003), created a 
strong incentive for industry actors to help create and participate in NSMD governance.  
Likewise, supporters from both programs deployed a combination of informing and conforming 
strategies. While the FLP achieved some success in bringing a diverse set of actors to a tentative 
agreement, cracks were beginning to show quite early. The MAC, on the other hand, held a series of 
meetings in the US where representation from the many and diffuse stakeholders was lacking. This 
can help explain why the expectations never truly aligned with the realities on the ground. While both 
schemes achieved a certain measure of success in gaining both pragmatic and moral legitimacy, 
ultimately, they struggled to maintain either and eventually failed. 
In particular, the deployment of effective conforming strategies proved difficult for the initiators 
and close supporters of the FLP and MAC. There appears to be a balance that must be reached 
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between moral and pragmatic legitimacy. This often, but not always, reflects the balance that an 
NSMD scheme must reach between the demands of civil society and industry actors. As Cashore 
(Cashore, 2002: 519) has noted, ‘those granting moral legitimacy act as a brake on what NSMD 
governance systems can do – or not do – to achieve pragmatic legitimacy (…)’. In the cases explored 
above, there seems to have indeed been a tense negotiation between achieving pragmatic and moral 
legitimacy. In the FLP case, it split the stakeholders, depriving the program of key resources and 
ultimately leading to its demise. In the MAC case, program initiators failed to include suppliers in the 
negotiations and then attempted to help them conform to the standards, a capacity building exercise 
that proved slow and costly. The result was a loss of funding and eventual failure. 
A big part of this failure can also be explained by the structure of the institutional environments in 
which these NSMD schemes operated. In both cases, we found that the highly fragmented nature of 
the marine ornamentals and cut flower industries posed a challenge to NSMD governance in these 
sectors. It made certification time consuming and costly; economic actors are less likely to grant 
pragmatic support in these environments. 
In addition, each case encountered a unique set of environmental challenges that impacted the 
effectiveness of the legitimation strategies employed. Arguably, the most important environmental 
factor undermining the FLP was the emergence of competitor schemes. These competitor schemes 
challenged the FLP on both pragmatic and moral grounds, leading to a deterioration of its legitimacy 
and eventual loss of support from both industry and civil society. In the MAC case, the lack of 
political salience was a problem. With little political pressure on either demand-side or supply-side 
economic actors, the MAC could not garner the pragmatic legitimacy from these audiences that it 
needed to survive. 
As a first step toward understanding the relationship between delegitimation and institutional 
failure, this study is necessarily exploratory in character. Future research in this area should now build 
off these modest insights, possibly setting up structured comparisons between relatively more 
successful cases and those that have failed, testing the various dimensions of these mechanisms in 
more detail moving forward. 
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